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International Tribunals and Forum Non
Conveniens Analysis
Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 315 F.3d 390 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 278 (2003).
Many international civil disputes are resolved via state-driven litigation
before multinational tribunals. Indeed, under traditional principles of
international law, individuals may not appear before such tribunals at all.
Instead, states must advance claims on behalf of their nationals, a procedure
known as diplomatic espousal.'
As the D.C. Circuit's decision in Nemariam v. Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia2 demonstrates, U.S. courts rarely consider such
international tribunals adequate to vindicate individual claimants' interests,
because the tribunals' procedures are often in tension with American
notions of due process. Accordingly, many courts find that international
tribunals are inadequate alternative forums under forum non conveniens
analysis.3 In so holding, courts are allowing forum non conveniens, a
1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 902(2) (1986).
2. 315 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 278 (2003).
3. Under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may decline to exercise
its jurisdiction because a more convenient alternative forum exists. The touchstone cases in the
United States, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), and Koster v. (American)
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947), endorse a presumption in favor of the
plaintiffs choice of forum, mandating that it be disturbed only rarely and in compelling
circumstances. See Koster, 330 U.S. at 531-32; Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
Forum non conveniens analysis involves two steps. First, a court must determine if an
adequate alternative forum exists. Second, assuming that such a forum exists, the court must
balance the private and public interests at stake to determine whether trial in the plaintiff's chosen
forum would "establish... oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant... out of all proportion to
plaintiffs convenience," or whether the "chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of
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doctrine developed to balance proceedings between courts, to undermine
the authority of international tribunals-a very different type of
adjudicative body.
This Comment argues that, in evaluating whether an international
tribunal is an adequate alternative forum under forum non conveniens
analysis, U.S. courts should focus less on formalistic factors like the
identities of the parties who espouse claims before the tribunal and more on
the ability of those parties to represent the interests of the individuals whose
claims they advance.4 Emphasizing interest representation, rather than party
structure, would help U.S. courts avoid undercutting established
international institutions; lessen the perception of U.S. courts as
disconnected players in a multilateral world; and allow war-tom states to
devote their resources to broad-based compensation and redevelopment,
rather than to the litigation of private claims in multiple forums.
Part I of this Comment details the background of the Nemariam dispute
and describes the D.C. Circuit's holding. Part II explains why the D.C.
Circuit's decision is so troubling and argues that the decision's focus on
party structure is inappropriate when considering the adequacy of an
international tribunal as an alternative forum. Part III lays out alternative
bases for the court's holding that would be more consistent with settled
international law and would pose less of a threat to the continued
effectiveness of international dispute resolution bodies. Part IV concludes.
I
In May 1998, a simmering border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea
erupted into war. By October 1999, the government of Ethiopia had
expelled 30,000 to 70,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent from
the country.5 Many of the deportees were merchants; the Ethiopian
government froze their assets and revoked their business licenses.
6
In June 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a provisional cease-fire; six
months later, the nations formally agreed to end their dispute.7 The peace
treaty between the nations created a Claims Commission charged with, inter
considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems." Koster, 330 U.S. at
524; see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1982) (elaborating on this
balancing test in the context of international disputes).
4. This Comment does not argue that forum non conveniens analysis should be changed in all
cases-just that the analysis should be reconsidered in the context of cases in which the alternate
forum under consideration is an international tribunal.
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1999, at 40 (1999), available at
http://hrw.org/worldreport99/africa/ethiopia.html.
6. See id. at 41.
7. See Peace Agreement, Dec. 12, 2000, Eth.-Eri., 2138 U.N.T.S. 93, 40 I.L.M. 260.
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alia, using binding arbitration to decide all conflict-related claims for loss,
damage, or injury by the nationals of one nation against the government of
the other resulting from violations of international law. 8 By the terms of the
agreement, individuals cannot bring claims before the Commission. Instead,
each government may bring claims on behalf of its nationals and certain
other individuals. 9
One of the merchants expelled from Ethiopia was Hiwot Nemariam.
After her expulsion, Nemariam emigrated to the United States. She brought
suit against the government of Ethiopia and its national commercial bank,
which controlled her confiscated assets, in federal court in June 2000-just
days after the signing of the cease-fire agreement.10
In November 2000, Ethiopia and the national bank moved to dismiss
Nemariam's federal case, in part on forum non conveniens grounds. Nine
months later, the district court granted the motion, determining that the
Commission provided an adequate alternative forum and that the private
and public interest factors key to forum non conveniens analysis weighed
decisively in favor of the Commission.
However, the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Commission did
not provide an adequate alternative forum to aggrieved individuals and
reinstating Nemariam's federal court case. The court focused only on the
first part of the forum non conveniens test and was troubled by two
factors.' 1 First, the Commission could not award relief directly to
individuals, who could not be parties before it. Second, because individuals
could not appear before the Commission, the governments bringing claims
on their behalf could potentially set off individuals' claims. That is, the
governments could net out the amounts they each owed to the other's
nationals, with the government that owed a net amount paying only that
amount to the other for distribution.
II
At first glance, the D.C. Circuit's decision seems required on due
process grounds. A U.S. court probably could not dismiss a litigant's case
on forum non conveniens grounds if, in a foreign country's domestic court,
that litigant (1) could not appear, 12 (2) could not control the litigation, 13 (3)
8. See id. at 97,40 I.L.M. at 262.
9. See id. at 98, 40 I.L.M. at 263.
10. Nemariam sued under the international takings exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000).
11. Nemariam, 315 F.3d at 394.
12. Cf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979); Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (noting that "[t]he fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard" and stating that this right has little worth if a
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could not determine whether or not to settle the case, 14 and (4) might not be
able to obtain a judgment because her claim could be set off against the
claims of others.15 All of these are characteristics of Nemariam's alternative
forum, the Claims Commission.
However, the court was faced with deciding whether an international
tribunal, rather than a foreign country's domestic court, presented an
adequate alternative forum. Only nation-states may appear before many
international judicial institutions-not only the Claims Commission, but
also bodies like the International Court of Justice16 and the World Trade
Organization. 17 Such tribunals are constructed to enforce international law,
which was traditionally a vehicle to resolve disputes between nations, not
disputes between individuals and a foreign state.' 8
The Supreme Court has affirmed the settled view that nation-states
control the causes of action that can be brought before international
tribunals. The Court's decision in Dames & Moore v. Regan establishes that
when U.S. nationals have a claim against another nation, the United States
government, not its nationals, "owns" the claim and controls the manner in
which it may be brought. 19 Likewise, a number of cases suggest that when
the United States has received funds from another state based on an
individual's claim before an international tribunal, the United States may
refrain from distributing the funds to the claimant.2 °
Accordingly, in considering Ethiopia's forum non conveniens motion,
the D.C. Circuit faced a formidable problem, albeit one the court did not
litigant cannot choose for himself whether or not to appear (internal quotation marks omitted));
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 102 (1921) ("[T]he essential element of due process [is] the
right to appear and be heard in defense of the action .... ).
13. Cf Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989).
14. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002); Grace M. Giesel, Enforcement
of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney Agent, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 543, 548
(1999) ("In the United States, a basic legal ethics principle is that the client ... controls the
decision to settle and the terms of settlement.").
15. Cf Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 412 (3d Cir.
1993).
16. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34(1), 59 Stat. 1055,
1059, T.S. No. 993.
17. See Marcia J. Staff & Christine W. Lewis, Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Past,
Present, and Future, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 301, 309 (2003).
18. See RALPH G. STEINHARDT, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE RISE OF INTERMESTIC LAW 5 (2002).
19. 453 U.S. 654, 679-80 (1981) (noting that the United States "has repeatedly... settle[d]
the claims of its nationals against foreign countries"--sometimes "dispos[ing] of the claims of its
citizens without their consent . . . [and] without exclusive regard for their interests" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
20. See, e.g., La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 463 (1899)
(upholding an act of Congress preventing disbursement of funds to a private plaintiff that had
been paid to the United States by Mexico); see also United States ex rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139
U.S. 306, 322 (1891); Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63, 73 (1884).
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recognize. American notions of due process generally require that
individuals control their own litigation, but settled principles of
international law dictate that individuals rarely espouse their own claims
before international tribunals. Thus, U.S. courts applying American notions
of due process in conducting forum non conveniens analysis may impugn
the legitimacy of international tribunals like the Claims Commission.
Such logic has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of a range
of international tribunals. Commissions that rely on diplomatic espousal for
the bringing of claims are often used to resolve the individual claims
precipitated by major conflicts. In recent years, such commissions have
been established to resolve private claims related to the Iranian
Revolution,2 the first Persian Gulf War,22 and ethnic cleansing in the
Balkans.23 However, if U.S. courts suggest that the tribunals are somehow
lacking in due process, the respect the commissions' judgments are
accorded-and, with it, their effectiveness-may be decreased as litigants
ignore or circumvent their decrees.
Alternatively, this reasoning may undercut the respect that U.S. courts
are accorded by other nations and their citizens. If even well-respected
institutions are derided by U.S. courts as inadequate, then U.S. courts may
be marginalized as out of step with international values.
Further, such logic may delay the resolution of some conflicts and force
war-tom states to divert their scarce resources from redevelopment.
Establishing a commission allows nations to end hostilities more quickly
than they otherwise could, because a peace treaty between them need only
contain the broad outlines of an agreement regarding individual claims,
leaving the commission to negotiate the more arduous details. The reliance
of such commissions on diplomatic espousal helps facilitate the provision
of relief to large numbers of claimants in an efficient manner, prevents the
tribunals' dockets from being overrun, and provides a mechanism for fairly
apportioning often limited funds.
However, the D.C. Circuit's reasoning suggests that states that have in
the past assented to the jurisdiction of such commissions-or that may do
so in the future-would be forced to defend themselves, not just before the
commissions, but in any U.S. court that could assert jurisdiction over them.
21. For a description of the han-United States Claims Tribunal, see GEORGE H. ALDRICH,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1996).
22. For a description of the United Nations Compensation Commission, see Lea Carol Owen,
Note, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The U.N. Compensation Commission and Its Treatment of
Gulf War Claims, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 499 (1998).
23. For a description of the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and
Refugees, see Hans van Houtte, Mass Property Claim Resolution in a Post-War Society: The
Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 625
(1999).
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This multiplication of litigation may stall post-conflict redevelopment
within each state.24 Further, the increase in expected expenses associated
with such litigation exposure may alter the cost-benefit analysis by states
considering whether to sign peace agreements, making peace less cost
effective and increasing the likelihood of prolonged conflict.
III
Instead of focusing on party-structure differences, the D.C. Circuit
should have resolved Ethiopia's forum non conveniens motion in one of
two ways.
First, and most narrowly, the court could have determined that
Nemariam's case fit within an exception in the treaty between Ethiopia and
Eritrea. That treaty vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Commission over all
claims arising from the conflict, except for those filed in another forum
prior to the effective date of the treaty.25 Nemariam filed her district court
case some six months before the treaty was signed. The court of appeals
ignored this possible line of decision. Though resolving the case this way
would not have relieved the underlying tension inherent in U.S. courts'
application of forum non conveniens analysis to problems involving
international tribunals, such a decision would at least not have created a
problematic precedent.
Second, the court could have focused on the ability of the parties before
the Commission to represent Nemariam's interests. Such an inquiry might
have been similar to the inquiry courts conduct in class action settings, with
the country advancing the claim before the tribunal being akin to the named
plaintiff in a class action. Application of the class action framework to the
Commission suggests that the D.C. Circuit's two-part critique of the
Commission need not carry the day; the factors the court criticizes are
typical of class actions as well, but their presence in that setting has not
resulted in courts barring all such actions. In the class action setting,
representatives are approved based not on their identity but on their ability
to "fairly and adequately" protect and represent the interests of the class.
26
That all plaintiffs may not receive full compensation does not make a class
24. Analogous concerns about the inefficiency of litigation in multiple forums motivated the
development of procedures for the consolidation of litigation across multiple districts in the
United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); H.R. REP. NoS. 94-499, 94-1343 & 94-1373 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572; H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898.
25. See Peace Agreement, supra note 7,2138 U.N.T.S. at 98, 40 I.L.M. at 263.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), 23(g)(1)(B). The same is true for plaintiffs in derivative
actions by shareholders. See id. 23. 1.
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action untenable: Those who advance a claim on behalf of a class can settle
or waive claims of class members, subject to approval by the court. 27
In conducting this interest analysis, the D.C. Circuit need not have been
troubled by the possibility that Eritrea and Ethiopia might set off their
respective nationals' claims. Eritrea indicated in a memorandum to the
Commission that "awards should be given directly to claimants" and that
"[flinancial compensation for large amounts of property damage should...
be given directly to the individual victims."28 While the D.C. Circuit noted
that Eritrea had informed the Commission that in some instances practical
difficulties associated with distribution might preclude individualized
compensation, the court noted that the circumstances of Nemariam's case
appeared different. 9 While nothing in the record indicated that Eritrea
would set off claims-an absence the district court found persuasive 3 -the
D.C. Circuit focused on the fact that it could, holding that Eritrea's
goodwill provided inadequate security that Nemariam would be
compensated.31
However, U.S. courts have relied explicitly on the goodwill of the
parties in a range of decisions. In a well-known tort suit stemming from a
gas plant disaster in India, the defendant's pledge to consent to the
jurisdiction of the Indian courts and to continue to waive certain defenses
was vital to the U.S. court granting the defendant's request to dismiss the
case on forum non conveniens grounds.32 Similarly, the immediate
effectiveness of a declaratory judgment depends on the voluntary
compliance of the burdened party.33 Ultimately, even if a focus on Eritrea's
ability to protect Nemariam's interests would not have resulted in a
different outcome in this case, such an approach would have been less
troubling than the D.C. Circuit's, because it would not have marked the
U.S. court system as categorically opposed to many established
international tribunals.
27. See id. 23(e).
28. Nemariam, 315 F.3d at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. See id.
30. See Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, No. 00-1392 (TPJ), slip op. at
10 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2001).
31. See Nemariam, 315 F.3d at 394-95.
32. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in relevant part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). The district
court's requirement that Union Carbide "consent to the Indian court's personal jurisdiction over it
and waive the statute of limitations as a defense [was] not unusual and [similar conditions] have
been imposed in numerous cases where the foreign court would not provide an adequate
alternative in the absence of such a condition." In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1987).
33. See OWEN M. Fiss & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 28-29 (2003).
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IV
Some may argue that it is not necessary to reexamine the relation of the
forum non conveniens doctrine to cases that might have been brought
before international tribunals. After all, a number of other defenses provide
a way for defendants in international civil disputes-often states or their
instrumentalities-to dismiss frivolous lawsuits on summary judgment,
while still ensuring that plaintiffs with meritorious claims can access U.S.
courts. Such doctrines include foreign sovereign immunity,34 head of state
immunity, 35 the act of state doctrine, 36 and the political question doctrine.
37
However, because a U.S. court using such doctrines addresses the substance
of the dispute,38 its decision may undercut any decisions that an
international tribunal later reaches on the same case. The use of the forum
non conveniens doctrine, by contrast, delves far less into substance. It thus
does not so seriously undermine the legitimacy of any decision reached by a
tribunal, because it does not lead to a seemingly conflicting decision on the
same set of facts. Accordingly, it is vital that forum non conveniens
analysis, as applied to international tribunals, be updated with a new focus
on interest representation.
-Ryan T. Bergsieker
34. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 619-21
(1983).
35. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
36. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-37 (1964).
37. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
38. For example, a U.S. court determining whether an action fits within an exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act looks searchingly at the conduct itself. See Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson. 507 U.S. 349. 356-62 (1993).
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